by the satisfaction of justice the retribution of so much pain for so much guilt; which is the dispensation we expect at the hand of God, and which we are accustomed to consider as the order of things that perfect justice dictates or requires. In what sense, or whether with truth in any sense, justice may be said to demand the punishment of offenders, he does not inquire ; but he asserts that this demand is not the motive or occasion of human punishments. The fear lest the escape of the criminal should encourage him, or others by his example, to repeat the same crime, or to commit different crimes, is the sole consideration which authorises the infliction of punishment by human laws. Now, that, whatever it be, which is the cause and end of the punishment ought, undoubtedly, to regulate the measure of its severity. But this cause appears to be founded, not in the guilt of the offender, but in the necessity of preventing the repetition of the offence. The crimes must be prevented by some means or other ; and, consequently, whatever means appear necessary to this end, whether they be proportionable to the guilt of the criminal or not, are adopted rightly, because they are adopted upon the principle which alone justifies the infliction of punishment at all. From the same consideration it also follows, that punishment ought not to be employed, much less rendered severe, when the crime can be prevented by any other means.
Punishment is an evil to which the magistrate resorts only from its being necessary to the prevention of a greater. This necessity does not exist when the end may be attained, that is, when the public may be defended from the effects of the crime, by any other expedient. The right of punishment results from the necessity of preventing the crime." It follows, consequently, from the principles of moral and political philosophy, that if capital punishment for murder fails as a preventive of the crime, it ought to be abolished, and some more effectual preventive be substituted for it; and that certain popular modes of thinking and speaking are inadmissible, derived from the principle of retaliation, such as " the satisfaction of a natural instinct," " public indignation," against the offender and his offence, &c. The social economist doubts the expediency of capital punishment for murder, upon observing the conduct, language, &c., of by far the greatest proportion of persons assembled to witness the spectacle, evidently attracted thither only for the sake of gratifying certain 
